by Douglas Ankney

In an issue of first impression, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (“ICE”) execution of a removal warrant following a final order entered by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) does not qualify as a “pending proceeding … being had before any department or agency of the United States” under 18 U.S.C. § 1505. The Court separately held that ICE’s enforcement of the removal warrant does not independently constitute a pending proceeding under the statute, reasoning that such activity amounts to routine law enforcement rather than an administrative proceeding within the statute’s reach.

Background

In July 2016, Dennis Zeledon Hernandez, a noncitizen from El Salvador, encountered Border Patrol officials while crossing the southern border near Hidalgo, Texas. An asylum officer found he had established a credible fear of persecution, and he was released on bond with instructions to appear for future immigration hearings. When Zeledon failed to appear for a December 2019 hearing, an immigration judge ordered him removed in absentia. The order became final immediately upon entry.

More than three years elapsed before ICE acted. In May 2023, after Virginia police arrested Zeledon on an unrelated offense, ICE issued a warrant for his removal and transferred him to a detention facility. His immigration attorney filed a motion to reopen, which the immigration judge denied. With his deportation scheduled for July 12, 2023, Zeledon escaped the facility on July 2 and was apprehended five days later in North Carolina.

A grand jury indicted Zeledon on two counts: (1) escape from federal custody under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) and (2) corruptly obstructing a pending proceeding under § 1505. Section 1505 makes it a crime to obstruct a “pending proceeding” before a “department or agency of” the U.S. At a bench trial, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia acquitted Zeledon on the escape charge but convicted him on the obstruction count, concluding that ICE’s execution of the EOIR-issued removal order was part of EOIR’s proceedings. Zeledon received a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment.

Analysis

The Court reviewed the District Court’s denial of Zeledon’s motion for acquittal de novo as a question of statutory interpretation. South Carolina v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 66 F.4th 189 (4th Cir. 2023). It noted that no federal circuit had previously addressed whether § 1505 encompasses immigration removal proceedings.

Beginning with the statutory text, the Court examined the phrase “pending proceeding … being had before any department or agency.” The Court explained that the qualifying language indicates that § 1505 targets administrative proceedings. Black’s Law Dictionary defines that term as “[a] hearing, inquiry, investigation, or trial before an administrative agency, usu[ally] adjudicatory in nature but sometimes quasi-legislative.” The Court noted that “pending” and “before” each impose independent constraints. Dictionary definitions contemporaneous with the statute’s 1948 enactment define “pending” as begun but not yet completed and “before” as in front of or in the presence of a decision-maker.

These terms, read in combination, preclude treating ICE’s warrant execution as part of EOIR’s proceedings because the immigration court’s adjudicatory role had ended, the Court reasoned. Federal immigration law reinforced this conclusion. Congress specified that a removal order issues “[a]t the conclusion of the [removal] proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A), and the applicable regulation provides it becomes “final … immediately upon entry.” 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1. Extending “proceeding” to post-judgment enforcement would strip “pending” and “before” of any independent meaning, contrary to the principle that “Congress would not ordinarily introduce a general term that renders meaningless the specific text that accompanies it.” Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480 (2024).

The Court invoked the longstanding principle, recognized across multiple circuits, that § 1505 does not reach “mere police” activity. United States v. Kirst, 54 F.4th 610 (9th Cir. 2022); United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Rice v. United States, 356 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1966). In Kelley, the D.C. Circuit recognized that whether an agency possesses rulemaking or adjudicative authority over the relevant subject matter helps distinguish a “proceeding” from ordinary law enforcement. Because ICE holds neither power with respect to noncitizens, the Court concluded that its enforcement of a judgment entered by a separate tribunal resembles routine police activity that is comparable to an officer effectuating an arrest pursuant to a magistrate’s warrant.

Reviewing the broader criminal code, the Court observed that Congress had already enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1253, which specifically criminalizes hampering a noncitizen’s departure when a final removal order is outstanding. The existence of that specific statutory vehicle bolstered the narrower reading of § 1505, and the Supreme Court in Fischer rejected a similar attempt to distinguish overlapping obstruction statutes based solely on differing mental-state requirements. The Court also applied the traditional principle of restraint when assessing the scope of federal criminal statutes. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995).

Turning to the Government’s alternative theory, the Court concluded that ICE’s enforcement of the removal warrant was not itself a pending proceeding. Although sister circuits have broadly interpreted “proceeding” under § 1505, the Court stated that this breadth has recognized limits and does not encompass isolated enforcement action. The Court distinguished the Government’s two principal authorities on the ground that the enforcing agency in each was the same entity that had investigated the underlying violations. In Senffner, the Seventh Circuit ruled that obstructing the SEC’s litigation in federal court also obstructed the SEC’s own investigation and enforcement of securities law violations. Similarly, in United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit treated interference with IRS tax collection as obstruction of an ongoing IRS proceeding. Importantly, the Court explained that neither decision involved one agency merely carrying out a judgment issued by a different tribunal, which is the circumstance presented in the present case.

The Court also rejected the Government’s reliance on Kirst, where the Ninth Circuit concluded that the NTSB’s crash investigation qualified as a “proceeding” partly because the agency’s subpoena and oath-administration powers enhanced its factual development for potential adjudicative processes. The Court clarified that possessing such powers does not convert every agency action into a proceeding. The critical factor is whether the agency deploys them in service of an adjudicative or investigative function, which ICE was not doing when it executed the removal warrant.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court reversed the District Court’s determination, vacated Zeledon’s conviction under § 1505, and remanded for further proceedings. See: United States v. Zeledon Hernandez, 173 F.4th 94 (4th Cir. 2026).

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