by Douglas Ankney

The Court of Appeal of California, Sixth District, held that a police officer’s decision to impound a vehicle pursuant to the Vehicle Code solely to prevent the driver from continuing to drive on a suspended license does not satisfy the community caretaking function required under the Fourth Amendment. The Court determined that while the Vehicle Code authorized the impoundment, statutory authorization alone does not establish constitutional reasonableness. The prosecution must additionally demonstrate that removal of the vehicle served a community caretaking function based on facts specific to the vehicle itself. Because the defendant’s minivan was legally parked, was not blocking traffic, showed no risk of theft or vandalism, and the officer’s only stated justification was preventing future unlicensed driving, the impoundment and resulting inventory search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded with directions to permit the defendant to withdraw his no contest pleas.

Background

On May 26, 2022, Milpitas Police Department Officer Eric Bernardo observed Eric Jaime Perez’s minivan exit a gas station without stopping before crossing a sidewalk, in violation of the Milpitas Municipal Code. Perez pulled over and legally parked on South Main Street without blocking traffic. When Bernardo approached, Perez said he did not have his license and believed it had been “revoked,” and a records check showed his license had been suspended since 1993.

Bernardo handcuffed Perez and told him officers would search the minivan because it was being towed and impounded “pursuant to [Perez] driving on a suspended license.” Bernardo testified that he intended to cite Perez for violating Vehicle Code § 14601 and release him without taking him into custody. He explained that impounding vehicles driven by people with suspended licenses was his “common practice” because otherwise they might “go right back in the vehicle and continue to drive.” He also acknowledged that the Milpitas Police Department had no policy specifically requiring impoundment in that situation and said the decision was based on his “personal practice.”

During the inventory search, officers found narcotics, cash, and a digital scale in the minivan. Bernardo also confirmed that Perez did not consent to the search, the minivan’s windshield and doors were intact, he never asked Perez whether he wanted to call someone to move the vehicle, and no high-value items were visible in plain view. After officers later searched a nearby hotel room linked to Perez, the prosecution charged him with firearm and drug offenses, among other charges. The magistrate denied Perez’s suppression motion, the trial court denied his renewed motion, and Perez pleaded no contest and timely appealed

Analysis

The Court explained that, when reviewing a suppression motion initially heard by a magistrate, the appellate court directly reviews the magistrate’s determination, accepts factual findings supported by substantial evidence, and independently applies Fourth Amendment standards to decide whether the challenged search was constitutionally reasonable. People v. McWilliams, 524 P.3d 768 (Cal. 2023); People v. Romeo, 240 Cal. App. 4th 931 (2015).

The Community
Caretaking Doctrine

The Fourth Amendment guarantees protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and “the impoundment of an automobile is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2005). A warrantless seizure is presumed unconstitutional, placing the burden on the government to establish an exception to the warrant requirement. People v. Rogers, 209 P.3d 977 (Cal. 2009).

The community caretaking function constitutes one such exception, permitting officers to “impound vehicles that ‘jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.’” Miranda (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)). The Court observed that Opperman described this function as encompassing removal of disabled or damaged vehicles from highways, impoundment of automobiles violating parking ordinances, and seizure of vehicles “impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience.”

When evaluating an inventory search following impoundment, courts “focus on the purpose of the impound rather than the purpose of the inventory.” People v. Lee, 40 Cal. App. 5th 853 (2019). The impoundment decision “must be justified by a community caretaking function ‘other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity’” because inventory searches are “conducted in the absence of probable cause,” the Court explained. Examples include vehicles parked illegally, blocking traffic, or at risk of theft or vandalism.

The Court observed that “[r]easonableness is ‘the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,’” and “[t]he question is ‘whether a decision to impound or remove a vehicle …was reasonable under all the circumstances.’” People v. Duong, 471 P.3d 352 (Cal. 2020). While officers need not adopt the least intrusive course of action, the impoundment “must nonetheless be reasonable in light of the justification for the impound and inventory exception.” People v. Williams, 145 Cal. App. 4th 756 (2006).

Statutory Authorization Does Not Establish Constitutional Reasonableness

The Court agreed with the Attorney General that Bernardo’s decision to impound the minivan was authorized under Vehicle Code § 22651, subdivision (p), which permits impoundment when an officer issues a citation for driving on a suspended license. The Court also found the record supported an implied finding that Bernardo’s decision was not based on investigative pretext.

However, the Court stated that statutory authorization “does not, in and of itself, determine the constitutional reasonableness of the seizure.” The Court explained that “the prosecution bears the further burden to show that an impoundment is constitutionally reasonable under the circumstances.” Williams. In other words, “notwithstanding general statutory authorization for impoundment, the prosecution must show that the removal of a vehicle from the street is specifically justified by a community caretaking function based on the facts surrounding the vehicle itself.”

The Court found the prosecution failed to carry this additional burden. While the record supported Bernardo’s concerns about Perez as a driver, “the record shows no facts specific to Perez’s vehicle supporting application of the community caretaking function.”

Preventing Future Unlicensed Driving Is Insufficient

The Court rejected the prosecution’s argument that impounding a vehicle to prevent future unlicensed driving satisfies the community caretaking exception. In Blakes v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 5th 904 (2021), the Court of Appeal stated that a police practice “to tow when the driver had a suspended license to prevent more driving under a suspended license … does not provide a community caretaking function for the tow.” Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Brown, 415 P.3d 815 (Colo. 2018), explained that “the community caretaking exception … definitionally cannot support seizures on the basis of suspicion that the driver has committed, is committing, or will commit a crime.”

The Court stated that “[t]he need to deter a driver’s unlawful conduct is by itself insufficient to justify a tow under the ‘caretaker’ rationale.” Miranda. As the Court in Coalition on Homelessness v. City and County of San Francisco, 93 Cal. App. 5th 928 (2023), observed, “tows under the caretaking exception must address some present need of safety or convenience,” and courts “have expressly rejected the argument that deterring future misconduct can justify a tow under the exception, because that justification would not address a present need based on the location of the towed vehicle.”

Application to the Present Case

The Court found the prosecution elicited no evidence of any reason to impound the minivan other than preventing Perez from driving it after being cited and released. Bernardo testified the minivan was legally parked and not blocking traffic. The windshield and doors were intact, no high-value items were visible, and the prosecution presented no evidence the vehicle was in a high-crime area, was unregistered, or that Perez could not arrange for legal transport. Given these circumstances, no community caretaking purpose was served by the impoundment, the Court ruled.

The Court noted that even though Bernardo was not required to adopt the least intrusive approach, he could have deterred Perez from returning to drive by arresting him for the misdemeanor violation rather than citing and releasing him. The Court concluded that because the prosecution’s sole justification was preventing future unlicensed driving – without any facts specific to the vehicle’s location, condition, or circumstances – the impoundment was constitutionally unreasonable.

Conclusion

Thus, the Court held that the impoundment and resulting inventory search violated Perez’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded with directions for the trial court to permit Perez to withdraw his no contest pleas. If Perez elects to withdraw, the Court instructed that the trial court shall vacate its denial of the suppression motion, grant the motion, and conduct further proceedings consistent with the opinion. See: People v. Perez, 119 Cal. App. 5th 345 (2026).  

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