by David M. Reutter

The Supreme Court of Florida reversed a circuit court order that had denied a death-sentenced prisoner access to the underlying data generated during postconviction DNA testing. The Court held that the “results” a defendant is entitled to receive under § 925.11(2)(i), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853 encompass the underlying testing data necessary for a qualified expert to perform a statistical analysis, not merely a laboratory report stating that the testing was inconclusive where neither the laboratory nor the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) could perform the statistical analysis that FDLE itself suggested may be possible. The Court further held that once a circuit court grants a motion for postconviction DNA testing, the statute and rule impose no additional burden on the defendant to demonstrate how the data would lead to exoneration before receiving the complete results. Finally, the Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of separate public records demands seeking information about the testing laboratory’s internal process and protocols.

Background

James Aren Duckett is a prisoner under a sentence of death whose execution had been stayed. Following the issuance of a death warrant in February 2026, Duckett filed a motion under § 925.11 and Rule 3.853 requesting postconviction DNA testing of a 1987 swab taken from the victim’s underwear, designated Q-6(3), which contained a small number of sperm heads and had remained in the State’s continuous possession. Duckett argued that DNA testing would demonstrate the sperm was not his, thereby establishing his actual innocence. Over two decades earlier, the Florida Supreme Court had relinquished jurisdiction to allow the circuit court to explore whether Q-6(3) could be tested, but examiners at that time concluded the sample was too deteriorated for the methods then available.

In his renewed motion, Duckett sought testing using Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (“SNP”) technology, which permits more reliable analysis of small, degraded samples. Because the FDLE lacked SNP testing capability, the circuit court granted the motion and, under § 925.11(2)(h), permitted the State to exercise control over the location, timing, and method of testing. Q-6(3) was ultimately sent to DNA Labs International, Inc. (“DLI”), a private laboratory requested by the State.

When testing was completed, DLI’s Certificate of Analysis indicated at least one male contributor but concluded the data was insufficient for genealogical comparisons or phenotype and ancestry estimations. In an accompanying communication, FDLE characterized the results as “inconclusive” and explained that neither FDLE nor DLI possessed the capability to perform a statistical analysis on the Y-chromosome SNP data that testing had generated. Importantly, FDLE suggested that a qualified bioinformaticist might be able to provide statistical calculations based on that data.

Duckett then asked the circuit court to order release of the underlying testing data, so a bioinformaticist could perform the statistical analysis FDLE had identified as potentially feasible. He also filed public records demands under Rule 3.852(i), seeking both the testing data and information regarding DLI’s testing process and protocols. The State opposed on multiple grounds, arguing the results actually inculpated Duckett, that no further analysis was necessary, and that no evidentiary hearing was required. After two status conferences held on less than a day’s notice and at which no sworn testimony was taken, the circuit court denied Duckett’s requests. It concluded that Duckett had not demonstrated how the data he sought could lead to exoneration and that the public records demands were neither relevant to the subject matter of a proceeding under Rule 3.851 nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Duckett timely appealed.

Analysis

The Court began by establishing its jurisdiction, noting that § 925.11(3)(a) permits any adversely affected party to appeal an order on a postconviction DNA testing petition and that the challenged order was final because it concluded the Rule 3.853 proceedings. The Court observed that it has consistently exercised appellate jurisdiction over final orders denying capital defendants’ motions for postconviction DNA testing. Everett v. State, 377 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. 2024); Reynolds v. State, 373 So. 3d 1124 (Fla. 2023).

Turning to the merits, the Court concluded that the complete “results” to which Duckett was entitled under the statute and rule included the underlying testing data, not simply DLI’s report labeling its findings “inconclusive” when neither DLI nor FDLE could perform the very analysis that FDLE itself had suggested was possible. The Court’s reasoning was twofold.

First, the Court examined the statutory prerequisite for granting a DNA testing motion. Section 925.11 requires a court to find, among other things, that the testing results “would be admissible at trial.” As the State itself conceded, an expert presenting DNA evidence at trial must provide statistical calculations derived from the testing data. An expert is not permitted to simply announce a “match” without accompanying statistical support, the Court observed. Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1997). Based on this admissibility framework, the Court reasoned that the statute’s reference to results being admissible at trial indicates those results necessarily encompass the underlying data from which an expert could formulate a trial-worthy opinion.

Second, FDLE’s own communications confirmed that Duckett had received only partial results. The Court noted FDLE’s acknowledgment that testing had “yielded results for Y (male-specific) SNPs” but that neither FDLE nor DLI could assign statistical weight to those results. FDLE then suggested that an outside bioinformaticist could potentially provide the needed analysis using the Y SNP data. The Court determined that this language was significant, reasoning that FDLE’s interchangeable use of “Y SNP results” and “Y SNP data” supported treating the underlying data as an integral component of the testing results that had yet to be fully delivered. The Court also noted the important distinction between “inconclusive” and “incomplete,” stating that Duckett had not received the complete results because the underlying data had been withheld.

Having determined that the testing data constituted part of the statutory results, the Court addressed and rejected the circuit court’s rationale for denial. The lower court had required Duckett to demonstrate, through expert testimony or other evidence, how a statistical analysis of the data would lead to his exoneration. The Court ruled that this burden had “no basis in section 925.11 or rule 3.853.” Once a defendant’s motion for postconviction DNA testing is granted, meaning the defendant has already satisfied every statutory and procedural prerequisite, no further showing is required to receive the complete results, the Court instructed. By conditioning release of the data on an additional exoneration showing, the circuit court “compounded its error,” the Court concluded.

Regarding Duckett’s separate public records demands for DLI’s testing process and protocols, the Court found no abuse of discretion. It agreed that Duckett had not alleged how such information could relate to a colorable claim for postconviction relief, as required by Rule 3.852 and governing precedent. Dailey v. State, 283 So. 3d 782 (Fla. 2019). Because Duckett sought this material solely as potential impeachment evidence, the Court affirmed the denial.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding with instructions that the underlying DNA testing data be provided to Duckett so that a qualified bioinformaticist may perform the statistical analysis that FDLE identified as potentially feasible. The Court further directed the circuit court to hold an evidentiary hearing should any dispute arise regarding the scope of data necessary for that analysis. See: Duckett v. State, 2026 Fla. LEXIS 661 (2026) (per curiam).  

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