by Douglas Ankney

In a unanimous opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that when a District Court predetermines a supervisee’s revocation term of imprisonment at an earlier violation hearing, by committing in advance to impose a specified sentence for any future violation, and later relies on that promise to impose the sentence, the resulting term of imprisonment is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The Court vacated the statutory-maximum 24-month post-revocation term of imprisonment imposed by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio and remanded for further proceedings, concluding that the District Court bypassed the individualized sentencing process required when the sentence is actually imposed.

Background

Daniel Dale Barton, Sr. pleaded guilty to a single count of receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), (b)(1) and was sentenced to 84 months of imprisonment followed by 15 years of supervised release. After completing his custodial term, Barton commenced supervised release in January 2023. His conditions prohibited him from committing any criminal offense, traveling outside the Northern District of Ohio without authorization, and possessing internet-connected devices without his probation officer’s approval. His probation officer additionally instructed him not to view adult pornography.

Barton violated these conditions in multiple ways. He was cited for misdemeanor disorderly conduct while intoxicated, traveled to Pennsylvania without permission, and was discovered to possess an unapproved internet-connected tablet that he had used for over a year to view adult pornography and access online-dating platforms. At the February 2025 revocation hearing on these violations, which carried an advisory Guidelines range of three to nine months, the District Court presented Barton with an ultimatum rather than imposing a sentence. It offered Barton two options: (1) accept six months of imprisonment immediately or (2) continue on supervised release with the understanding that any future violation, no matter how minor, would result in the statutory-maximum sentence of 24 months. Barton chose to remain on supervision.

Approximately one month later, Barton’s probation officer discovered yet another unapproved internet-connected tablet that Barton had been using to view adult pornography since December 2024. At the April 2025 revocation hearing on these new violations, which again produced an advisory Guidelines range of three to nine months, the District Court imposed the 24-month statutory maximum. In doing so, it relied explicitly on the promise it had made at the earlier hearing, telling Barton that it had given him a choice, that the resulting sentence was his decision rather than the court’s, and that it intended to be “a man of my word.” Defense counsel objected to the above-Guidelines sentence. Barton timely appealed.

Analysis

The Court reviewed the reasonableness of Barton’s post-revocation sentence for abuse of discretion, rejecting the Government’s argument for plain-error review because the District Court failed to ask the parties whether they had any objections not previously raised, as required by United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004).

On procedural reasonableness, the Court identified two independent deficiencies in the District Court’s approach. First, the District Court inverted the proper sentencing sequence. Under Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), a sentencing court must begin with the applicable Guidelines range, afford the parties an opportunity to advocate for their preferred sentences, and consider the relevant statutory factors before imposing a sentence, the Court explained. Barton’s 24-month term, however, was not the product of this sequence at the second violation hearing. Instead, it had been preordained at the first. The Court characterized the District Court’s method as “too much like sentence first, trial afterwards,” quoting United States v. Tatum, 760 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2014).

Second, the Court concluded that predetermining a sentence inherently prevents the individualized assessment that Congress requires. At the time of the first violation hearing, the District Court could not have known what circumstances any future violation would present. Nevertheless, it committed to a specific punishment. The Court drew a parallel to its recent published decision in United States v. Collins, 171 F.4th 830 (6th Cir. 2026), where it held that a District Court’s blanket policy of refusing to consider early termination of supervised release until a defendant completed half the term violated the individualization mandate of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).

The Court distinguished its own unpublished decisions in United States v. Glass, 749 F. App’x 434 (6th Cir. 2018), and United States v. Epps, 655 F. App’x 444 (6th Cir. 2016), upon which the Government relied. Although the District Courts in those cases similarly warned defendants that future violations would result in maximum sentences and then followed through, those courts demonstrated at the later hearings that the sentences were independently grounded in the new violation conduct. In the present case, the District Court never clearly indicated that the sentence rested on anything other than its earlier promise, the Court noted. The District Court’s repeated statements that it was keeping its “word” and that the sentence was Barton’s “choice” revealed that it “simply default[ed] to its prior comments at the [earlier] hearing,” the Court concluded. Epps.

On substantive reasonableness, the Court determined that the 24-month term was also unreasonable because the District Court gave virtually no weight to the relevant sentencing factors. Its overriding concern was honoring its prior commitment, not calibrating a proportionate sanction. Because the sentence exceeded the advisory Guidelines range, no presumption of reasonableness applied. United States v. Morris, 71 F.4th 475 (6th Cir. 2023).

The Court stressed the limited scope of its holding. District Courts remain free to pair leniency toward supervisees with warnings that future violations will be treated seriously, and a defendant’s breach of the court’s trust may properly inform a later revocation sentence as one factor among many. United States v. Patterson, 158 F.4th 700 (6th Cir. 2025). Nor must District Courts enter revocation hearings as blank slates. They may arrive prepared and may have some preliminary sense of how the proceeding might end. United States v. Green, 167 F.4th 832 (6th Cir. 2026). However, the Court stated that what a court may not do is rely solely on a prior promise to impose a predetermined sentence instead of crafting an individualized revocation term after considering the evidence and arguments presented at the hearing.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the District Court and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See: United States v. Barton, 174 F.4th 1007 (6th Cir. 2026) (per curiam).  

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