by David M. Reutter

The Supreme Court of Florida unanimously held that Florida’s district courts of appeal may review a trial court’s refusal to impose a downward departure sentence. The Court reasoned that a sentencing order is a final order of a trial court, that the Florida Constitution grants the district courts jurisdiction over appeals of right from such orders, and that the Legislature has imposed no clear limit on review of a departure denial. Resolving a conflict among the district courts, it quashed the decision under review, approved three decisions holding to the contrary, and remanded.

Background

Eric Desmond Parrish was 16 years old when he raped his foster mother, who was 53. A jury found him guilty of sexual battery with force, battery, and false imprisonment, offenses carrying a permissible range under Florida’s Criminal Punishment Code of 146.85 months to life imprisonment. A sentence below that floor is authorized only where “there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify [it].” Fla. Stat. § 921.0026(1) (2020). A trial court faced with such a request applies the two-step test of Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 1999), asking whether a valid legal ground and adequate factual support for departure exist and, if so, whether departure is the best sentencing option in the case.

Parrish sought a departure as a youthful offender and on the ground that he needed, and was amenable to, specialized treatment for a mental disorder unrelated to substance abuse. Fla. Stat. § 921.0026(2)(d), (l) (2020). The trial court declined to make a step-one finding under Banks. Stating that the matter was “not even a close question,” it concluded that no departure was appropriate given Parrish’s “high risk for reoffending based on the evidence and based on [his] behavior.” The resulting sentence was 30 years on the sexual battery count and a concurrent five years on the false imprisonment count, with time served on the battery count.

The First District dismissed the portion of Parrish’s appeal challenging the refusal to depart, determining that “it lack[ed] authority to review a sentencing court’s decision not to grant a departure sentence.” That determination was based on Wilson v. State, 306 So. 3d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), which had certified conflict with Barnhill v. State, 140 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), Fogarty v. State, 158 So. 3d 669 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), and Kiley v. State, 273 So. 3d 193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). While review was pending, the First District changed course in Gazoombi v. State, 406 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025). It held that it had jurisdiction to review an alleged abuse of discretion in denying departure but that a trial court’s selection of a sentence within the authorized range ordinarily does not present a cognizable appellate harm absent an infringement of the defendant’s due-process right to a fair proceeding. The proper disposition of such a meritless claim is affirmance rather than dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, according to the First District. Because the district-court conflict existed when the Supreme Court accepted review, the Court retained jurisdiction. Fla. Const. art. V, § 3(b)(3).

Analysis

The Court began its analysis with the text of the Florida Constitution, which it interprets de novo. W. Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 79 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2012). Article V, section 4(b)(1) provides: “District courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final judgments or orders of trial courts.” Those words carry the “plain, usual, ordinary, and commonly accepted meanings” they bore “at the time they were written” and are read in context rather than in isolation. City of Tallahassee v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 375 So. 3d 178 (Fla. 2023).

Generally, a sentencing order is a final order. The Court observed that such an order “constitutes an end to the judicial labor in the cause,” leaving nothing further for the trial court to do to bring the case to an end between the affected parties. State v. Gaines, 770 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 2000). It remains distinct from a final judgment of conviction because the judgment resolves guilt, while the sentencing order fixes the punishment. Weathers v. State, 56 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1952). The Court noted that the criminal appeals statute and the appellate rules likewise treat a final judgment of conviction and a sentence as separately appealable. Fla. Stat. § 924.06 (2025); Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(1)(A), (E), (F), 9.140(b)(3).

Direct appeals in criminal cases are, by statute, “a matter of right.” Fla. Stat. § 924.05 (2025). On the basis of that statute and article V, section 4(b), the Court reaffirmed that “[c]riminal defendants are entitled to a direct appeal as a matter of right in Florida.” Sims v. State, 998 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 2008). That right is not absolute. The Legislature “may implement this constitutional right and place reasonable conditions upon it so long as they do not thwart the litigants’ legitimate appellate rights.” Amends. to Fla. Rules of App. Proc., 696 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1996). While it cannot “restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of the appellate courts to hear criminal appeals,” it may impose non-jurisdictional procedural bars, and a defendant who fails to satisfy them may face summary affirmance. State v. Jefferson, 758 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 2000). The Legislature is ordinarily explicit when it conditions appellate review in this fashion, the Court stated. Fla. Stat. §§ 924.051(3), (4), 775.084(3)(d)2. (2025).

No comparable limit governs review of a departure denial, the Court determined. Florida’s departure scheme addresses appellate review only once, providing that a sentence imposed below the lowest permissible sentence “is subject to appellate review under chapter 924, but the extent of downward departure is not subject to appellate review.” § 921.0026(1). A departure is thus reviewable, ordinarily at the State’s request, though its extent is not. Because the scheme says nothing about the refusal to depart, and because a court is “not at liberty to add words to statutes that were not placed there by the Legislature,” Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999), the Court concluded that the district courts may review such a refusal.

Conclusion

Thus, the Court approved Barnhill, Fogarty, and Kiley to the extent they held that appellate jurisdiction exists over a timely challenge to a trial court’s departure ruling, quashed Parrish and disapproved Wilson to the extent they reasoned to the opposite conclusion.

Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the First District for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See: Parrish v. State, 2026 Fla. LEXIS 964 (2026).  

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