by Dale Chappell

Kansas has become the thirty-third state to offer compensation to those who were wrongfully convicted. The new law signed by Gov. Jeff Colyer allows exonerees to be paid $65,000 for each year that they wrongfully spent in prison and $25,000 per year wrongfully on parole ...

by Dale Chappell

The Supreme Court of Appeals for Virginia held that convictions for both common law and statutory involuntary manslaughter for the same offense violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and remanded to vacate one of the convictions.

A jury convicted Carroll Gregg Jr., of both common law involuntary manslaughter ...

by Dale Chappell

Decades ago, it was acceptable, even laudable, for a cop to shoot an unarmed fleeing suspect in the back. That opinion, however, has changed over the years, but rarely does such an incident result in criminal charges against the officer. There are several reasons for that.

The ...

by Dale Chappell

A court must not automatically consider any single factor to be dispositive when deciding whether to deny or grant pretrial release, but must consider several factors on the record to determine if an accused must be detained, the New Mexico Supreme Court held.

Mariah Ferry, having been ...

by Dale Chappell

In an issue of first impression in Iowa, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that relief from a wrongful sentence is enough to allow a legal malpractice claim regarding that sentence, and the defendant need not obtain relief from the underlying conviction.

Having spent an extra year ...

by Dale Chappell

Law enforcement must secure a warrant prior to obtaining a urine sample from an arrestee, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held in an issue of first impression before the Court.

Hi Ta Lar was arrested after a lawful traffic stop turned up some marijuana and a ...

by Dale Chappell

A court must not automatically consider any single factor to be dispositive when deciding whether to deny or grant pretrial release, but must consider several factors on the record to determine if an accused must be detained, the New Mexico Supreme Court held.

Mariah Ferry, having been charged with first-degree murder, was granted pretrial release after the court determined that, while the crimes were “gruesome and heinous,” that alone was not enough to keep Ferry in jail until trial. The State disagreed and appealed that decision to the New Mexico Supreme Court.

On appeal, the State argued that the district court erroneously concluded that the nature of the charges, “no matter how serious the crime,” are “never sufficient” to prove a defendant’s future dangerousness and thus denial of pretrial release. The Supreme Court observed that is one reasonable interpretation of the district court’s ruling. However, another reasonable interpretation is that it did consider the seriousness of the charges and nevertheless concluded that certain conditions of release could still reasonably protect the community.

New Mexico law provides that bail may be denied by a court if the State proves “by clear and convincing evidence” that the ...

by Dale Chappell

“Finality” of an out-of-state conviction to support an enhanced sentence depends on whether Texas State law would consider that prior conviction “final,” not on the particular state of conviction, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held, finding a suspended sentence in California cannot serve as the basis for an enhanced sentence under the habitual-offender provision of Texas Penal Code § 12.42(d).

Jeremy Pue filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Criminal Appeals, claiming that his enhanced sentence based on his prior California suspended sentence for a controlled substance offense was not “final” and thus cannot serve to enhance his sentence as a habitual offender. Because it exceeded the statutory maximum, absent the enhancement, Pue argued that his sentence was illegal. The Court agreed and vacated his sentence.

A claim that a sentence is illegal because it exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense is cognizable in a writ of habeas corpus and may be raised at any time, even if it was not raised on direct appeal. Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Texas Penal Code § 12.42(d) provides that ...

by Dale Chappell

It is plain error when a trial court fails to instruct the jury on the burden of proof for justifiable use of force and who carries that burden, even if the error was not preserved for review on appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana held December 19, 2017.

At his trial for misdemeanor assault, Lee Akers raised the affirmative defense that he had acted in self-defense during an altercation. A jury found Akers guilty of assault, and he appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.

On appeal, Akers raised for the first time that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it was the State’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had not acted in self-defense, after he raised the affirmative defense of self-defense at trial. The State argued that since Akers did not raise the issue before, he failed to preserve it for review on appeal.

The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the burden of proof was plain error and reviewable even if not preserved for appeal.

Generally, an appellate court does not address issues raised for the first time on appeal; however ...

by Dale Chappell

In a major decision that may affect thousands with a prior Florida drug trafficking conviction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Florida’s drug trafficking statute under Fla. Stat. § 893.135 is indivisible and overbroad, and therefore not a “match” with its federal counterpart under the Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”).

After Natalia Cintron, a native of Argentina, was convicted for “trafficking in illegal drugs” under Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(c), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security began proceedings to deport her. When an immigration judge ordered her deportation, finding that Cintron’s conviction under § 893.135(1)(c) was a “drug trafficking crime” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), Cintron appealed to the Board of Immigrations Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA found that § 893.135(1)(c) was divisible and that Cintron’s conviction qualified as a drug trafficking crime, requiring her deportation. Cintron appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

The INA requires deportation of an alien who is convicted of an “aggravated felony,” which includes a “drug trafficking crime,” defined under the federal CSA as manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to do so. Mere possession ...