by David M. Reutter

The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed a district court’s ruling that La. R.S. 15:168(E)(3), which declares that no court “shall have jurisdiction to order the payment of any funds administered by the office or district public defender for expert witnesses, or for any other reason,” is unconstitutional. The Court determined that the statute infringes on the judiciary’s constitutionally granted jurisdiction under Louisiana Constitution Article 5, § 16(A), which vests district courts with exclusive original jurisdiction over felony cases, as well as the courts’ inherent authority to ensure indigent defendants receive the resources necessary for a constitutionally adequate defense. Based on decades of jurisprudence establishing that courts possess inherent power to order expert and investigative costs on behalf of indigent defendants, the Court concluded that the Legislature exceeded its authority by stripping the judiciary of the power to direct payment of those expenses.

Background

On August 1, 2022, a Terrebonne Parish grand jury indicted Maya Jones for first degree murder under La. R.S. 14:30 and obstruction of justice under La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1), stemming from the death of her two-year-old son. Jones entered a not guilty plea. The State initially filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty but later withdrew it.

In November 2024, Jones filed a motion seeking expert funding to retain a specialist to conduct community polling in support of a pending change-of-venue motion. She sought funding from the Office of the State Public Defender (“OSPD”) under the Louisiana Capital Defense Guidelines, but both her request and a subsequent request for reconsideration were denied. At a January 2025 hearing, the state public defender, Remy Starns, testified that his office evaluates such requests through a case-by-case deliberative process and exercises plenary authority over all aspects of the public defender system.

The district court ruled that Jones had satisfied the standard for expert necessity established in State v. Touchet, 642 So. 2d 1213 (La. 1994), but initially declined to order payment, concluding it was barred from doing so by La. R.S. 15:168(E)(3). Jones then challenged the statute’s constitutionality. The district court declared it unconstitutional, ruling that it violated Article 5 by eroding the court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the felony case and deprived the defendant of due process by eliminating any avenue for judicial review of the OSPD’s denial. The State timely appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

Analysis

The Court reviewed the constitutional ruling de novo. State v. Lee, 370 So. 3d 408 (La. 2023). It first acknowledged the well-established presumption favoring constitutionality, under which a challenger must demonstrate “clearly and convincingly that the constitutional aim was to deny to the legislature the power to enact the legislation.” Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128 (La. 1993).

The Court based its analysis on Louisiana’s separation of powers doctrine under Louisiana Constitution Article 2, §§ 1-2, which divides governmental authority among three branches and forbids any one branch from exercising power belonging to another. While the Legislature wields plenary power and may enact any legislation the Constitution does not prohibit, that authority has constitutional boundaries, the Court explained. Article 5, § 16(A) “effectively limits the powers of the Legislature and precludes the Legislature from changing the original jurisdiction of district courts fixed by the Constitution.” Pope v. State, 792 So. 2d 713 (La. 2001).

The Court explained that judicial power derives either from express constitutional grants or from inherent authority “reasonably necessary for the exercise of their function as courts.” State v. Umezulike, 866 So. 2d 794 (La. 2004). Under the inherent-powers doctrine, other branches of government “cannot, by denying resources or authority to the court, prevent the courts from carrying out their constitutional responsibilities as an independent branch of government.” Konrad v. Jefferson Parish Council, 520 So. 2d 393 (La. 1988). Although such powers must be exercised sparingly, the Court reiterated that it “will not sanction any legislation challenged on the basis that it has the effect of divesting or stripping the courts of their inherent power.” Fisher v. Harter, 395 So. 3d 806 (La. 2024).

The Court then traced the extensive jurisprudential history supporting its holding. In State in Interest of Johnson, 475 So. 2d 340 (La. 1985), the Supreme Court had recognized that “even in the absence of legislative or executive authorization, a court may, when reasonably necessary, appoint counsel for an indigent and award the attorney a reasonable fee to be paid from a source which the court deems appropriate.” State v. Craig, 637 So. 2d 437 (La. 1994), extended that principle to investigators and experts, finding “no reason to differentiate the need for payment to an indigent’s attorney from the need for payment of investigators and experts who assist that attorney.” Touchet then established that when an indigent defendant demonstrates expert assistance will be “necessary to the construction of an effective defense,” a district court must authorize the hiring of such an expert at the state’s expense, a standard reaffirmed in State v. Carley, 52 So. 3d 81 (La. 2011), according to the Court. Notably, the Court observed that each time its case law identified a particular funding source, the Legislature responded by amending statutes to redirect that obligation elsewhere, but no prior enactment had gone so far as to bar courts from ordering payment altogether.

The Court held that the constitutional grant of judicial power and original jurisdiction over felony cases under Article 5, § 16(A) encompasses the authority to order appropriate expert costs for indigent defendants. La. R.S. 15:168(E)(3) unconstitutionally infringes on that jurisdiction and on the courts’ inherent authority by prohibiting any court from ordering payment from indigent defense funds. The Court endorsed the district court’s reasoning that the Legislature “cannot write out the jurisdiction of the Court to review matters directly affecting the rights of a criminal defendant.”

Additionally, the Court determined that the statute violates the defendant’s right to access the courts under Louisiana Constitution Article 1, § 22 because it affords no opportunity for judicial review of the OSPD’s denial of funding. While the State pointed to the remedy recognized in State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325 (La. 2005), of halting prosecution until adequate funding is identified, the Court rejected this safeguard as inadequate. Such a result would be extreme and disruptive to the efficient administration of justice and would transfer effective control over the progression of criminal cases from judges to the state public defender without recourse, according to the Court.

The State also argued that Louisiana Constitution Article 1, § 13, which directs the Legislature to “provide for a uniform system for securing and compensating qualified counsel for indigents,” grants legislative authority over expert witness fee determinations free from judicial review. The Court disagreed. Citing State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993), it reasoned that this provision simply mandates that the Legislature take affirmative steps to protect the enumerated rights of defendants and was never intended to curtail the jurisdiction of the courts.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment declaring La. R.S. 15:168(E)(3) unconstitutional and remanded for further proceedings. See: State v. Jones, 2026 La. LEXIS 661 (2026).  

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