by David Kim

The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the prosecution failed to establish that a hospitalized defendant who had ingested a large quantity of LSD knowingly and intelligently waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and that admitting the resulting statement was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court reasoned that what mattered was whether the defendant could then comprehend those rights and what surrendering them would mean, not whether he was still hallucinating. It reversed the Court of Appeals, vacated the conviction, and remanded.

Background

On November 21, 2020, Zebadiah Soriano, then 18 years old, took six tabs of LSD, more than double his usual dose, with his friend AC. Soriano removed his pants and underwear, said “We’re going to do this,” forced himself on top of AC, and groped her. He chased and choked her when she escaped, then fled the house.

A deputy found Soriano beside a road at 5:30 a.m. Deputy Mike Ruggles arrested him and drove him to a medical center, where staff secured him in a restraint chair. Ruggles read Soriano the Miranda warnings roughly one hour after his arrest, while Soriano was still restrained. Ruggles was unable to say what words Soriano had used in waiving, and no written waiver existed. Early in the interrogation, which was not video-recorded, Soriano stated, “I am a rapist and I am fucked.”

The trial court denied Soriano’s motion to suppress the hospital statements. A jury convicted him of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct (“CSC”) involving sexual penetration and acquitted him of assault by strangulation. The Court of Appeals affirmed. In lieu of granting leave, the Supreme Court ordered oral argument on the waiver’s validity and on counsel’s failure to obtain an intoxication expert.

Analysis

The Court began its analysis by reviewing the Fifth Amendment protection against coerced self-incrimination and the warnings Miranda requires before custodial interrogation. Those rights may be relinquished but only voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, and the prosecution must prove a valid waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Daoud, 614 N.W.2d 152 (Mich. 2000).

The knowing-and-intelligent component “requires an inquiry into the suspect’s level of understanding, irrespective of police behavior” and turns on his “basic understanding” of his rights, not on the wisdom of surrendering them, the Court explained. Daoud. The question is whether the suspect “‘has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights,’” evaluated on the totality of the circumstances and in light of his “‘age, experience, education, background, and intelligence.’” People v. Cheatham, 551 N.W.2d 355 (Mich. 1996); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). The nonexhaustive voluntariness factors of People v. Cipriano, 429 N.W.2d 781 (Mich. 1988), may also assist in that examination, the Court noted.

Intoxication and Capacity
to Waive

The Court stated that voluntary intoxication does not by itself invalidate a Miranda waiver; it is one consideration among the totality. Daoud. Because intoxication can affect mental state, however, “[s]pecial care must be taken in assessing a waiver … where there is evidence that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs.” Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 746 N.E.2d 445 (Mass. 2001). The Court endorsed as a helpful guide the competence considerations of People v. Platt, 81 P.3d 1060 (Colo. 2004), i.e., whether the suspect appeared oriented to his situation, whether his answers were responsive and rational, whether he understood the seriousness of his position, whether he attempted to deceive the police to avoid prosecution, whether he expressed remorse, and whether he stated that he understood his rights. Courts elsewhere similarly ask whether a suspect was lucid and able to sustain a conversation, the Court noted. People v. Gipson, 787 N.W.2d 126 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010); United States v. Montgomery, 621 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2010); Commonwealth v. Walters, 149 N.E.3d 725 (Mass. 2020); State v. Strozier, 834 N.W.2d 857 (S.D. 2013); People v. Jewell, 175 P.3d 103 (Colo. 2008); Silanskas; Commonwealth v. Eden, 317 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1974). How much time separated ingestion from the alleged waiver is also relevant. Eden.

The Court instructed that it broke “no new ground” and that its decision “does not call into question prior cases addressing the more common situation” of a suspect questioned outside a hospital where officers knew only that an intoxicant had been consumed.

Application to Soriano

The parties agreed the hallucinations had ended before the warnings. The Court explained that the operative question was whether Soriano “had the mental capacity to understand his rights and the import of waiving those rights” and that the brief interval separating his erratic conduct from the warnings indicated that he did not. Eden. Ruggles described Soriano as “confused after coming down from [the] euphoria he was experiencing” and later told Soriano’s stepfather that Soriano was “too out of it.”

The Court acknowledged that Soriano’s outburst showed he knew he was in trouble but determined that this did not amount to comprehension of his Miranda rights. He gave the deputy few particulars, never tried to mislead officers, and displayed neither contrition nor awareness of his position, and so failed to show the capacity to “exercise[] discretion” that competence entails. Unlike suspects whose waivers were upheld because their statements were detailed and lucid, Soriano supplied no such indication. Platt; Jewell; Walters; People v. Gore, 452 N.E.2d 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). Soriano’s youth, his never having dealt with police before, and a night without food or sleep supported the same conclusion, though age weighs less for an adult than a minor, according to the Court. Cipriano. It distinguished Daoud, where every testifying expert accepted that the defendant had grasped what the warnings said despite his delusions. The prosecution therefore had not carried its burden. The Court declined to decide whether the waiver was voluntary and found it unnecessary to reach Soriano’s claim under Article 1, § 17 of the Michigan Constitution.

Harmless Error

A preserved, nonstructural constitutional error requires reversal unless the prosecution can “establish[] that it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Carines, 597 N.W.2d 130 (Mich. 1999). The Court of Appeals had reasoned that any error was harmless because AC’s testimony alone could sustain a CSC conviction. That analysis was erroneous, the Court ruled. An error is not harmless “simply because [the reviewing court] concludes the jury reached the right result.” People v. Mateo, 551 N.W.2d 891 (Mich. 1996). The governing question is whether an “average jury ‘would have found the prosecution’s case significantly less persuasive without the erroneously admitted testimony.’” People v. Sammons, 949 N.W.2d 36 (Mich. 2020).

The offense of conviction is a specific-intent crime requiring “a particular criminal intent beyond the act done,” so the prosecution had to prove that Soriano committed an assault with the intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration, the Court explained. People v. Beaudin, 339 N.W.2d 461 (Mich. 1983); People v. Starks, 701 N.W.2d 136 (Mich. 2005). Three items of proof were relevant to his intent: (1) Soriano’s removal of his pants and underwear, (2) AC’s account of what he said before and during the assault, and (3) his declaration that he was “a rapist.” The third overshadowed the others and was tantamount to an admission that he intended to commit a penetration offense, the Court determined. It also found evidence that the jury relied on the statement in the acquittal on the strangulation charge, which was supported by AC’s testimony but not by Soriano’s statement.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacated Soriano’s conviction, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See: People v. Soriano, 2026 Mich. LEXIS 1341 (2026).  

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