by Douglas Ankney

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia vacated a circuit court order that accepted a defendant’s 20-year-old guilty plea and imposed sentence under a binding plea agreement, holding that the circuit court erred by concluding the agreement’s binding nature eliminated its discretion to allow plea withdrawal. The Court held that a binding plea agreement entered pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(C) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure does not preclude a defendant from seeking to withdraw a guilty plea under Rule 32(e) prior to sentencing. Announcing a framework of first impression in the state, the Court held that circuit courts evaluating whether a defendant has demonstrated “any fair and just reason” to withdraw a guilty plea before sentence is imposed should consider the totality of the circumstances and a non-exhaustive six-factor list.

Background

In October 2001, Richard Page was accused of burglarizing a home in Jefferson County. A grand jury indicted him for burglary and petit larceny in September 2002. Page and the State negotiated a binding plea agreement under Rule 11(e)(1)(C), which provides that the State may agree to a specific sentence as part of a negotiated resolution. At a February 2003 hearing, Page pleaded guilty to burglary, executed a written guilty plea form, and the circuit court found the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. However, the court deferred its acceptance or rejection of the plea agreement pending a presentence investigation.

Page failed to appear at his March 2003 sentencing hearing, and the court issued a capias warrant. Page asserts he was arrested in Maryland on a separate warrant shortly after the plea hearing and served approximately two years of incarceration. Upon his release, whether through mistaken belief or faulty memory, he resumed his life without returning to resolve the Jefferson County matter. Despite multiple encounters with law enforcement over the ensuing years, no officer informed Page of or detained him on the outstanding capias.

In 2023, law enforcement stopped Page for a traffic violation and discovered the warrant. At a subsequent status hearing, Page’s counsel moved orally to withdraw the 2003 guilty plea or, alternatively, to reject the original plea agreement. The parties then negotiated a new agreement under which Page would withdraw his burglary plea and instead plead guilty to the lesser charge of petit larceny, with sentencing left to the court’s discretion. The circuit court initially appeared to accept this course of action and scheduled a change-of-plea hearing.

However, at that hearing, the court reversed course. It reasoned that the prior proceedings left the court in a “position of a plea binding upon the defendant that he cannot withdraw from.” It further stated that the binding nature of the plea meant that withdrawal was “beyond either party’s power.” The court accepted the 2003 guilty plea and sentenced Page to one to 15 years of imprisonment, suspended in favor of five years of supervised probation, i.e., the terms of the original binding agreement.

Analysis

The Court began its analysis by addressing the confusion in the proceedings below about the relationship between a guilty plea and a plea agreement. The Court explained that accepting a plea and accepting a plea agreement are procedurally separate events that may occur at different times. United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670 (1997). It observed that West Virginia’s Rule 11 draws the same distinction as the federal rule. Subdivisions (c) and (d) govern acceptance of a guilty plea, while subdivision (e) separately addresses plea agreement procedures. Other state courts have similarly recognized this distinction. State v. McGarvey, 579 P.3d 925 (Idaho 2025).

Turning to the circuit court’s central error, the Court explained that the “binding” character of a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) agreement constrains only the court’s sentencing discretion, requiring it to impose the agreed-upon sentence if it accepts the agreement, and does not eliminate a defendant’s ability to seek withdrawal of the underlying guilty plea. Rule 32(e), which governs plea withdrawal, permits a court to allow withdrawal before sentencing upon a showing of “any fair and just reason” and imposes no limitation based on the type of plea agreement. Thus, the Court concluded that the circuit court erred by treating the binding agreement as an absolute bar to withdrawal.

The Court rejected the notion that a defendant enjoys an unconditional right to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, reaffirming that “a defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing.” Duncil v. Kaufman, 394 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1990). It noted that Rule 11 creates an automatic withdrawal right in only two narrow circumstances: (1) when a defendant prevails on appeal from a conditional plea or (2) when the court rejects certain plea agreements. Outside those situations, the fair-and-just-reason standard governs.

The Court also addressed whether that standard applies when the court has not yet formally accepted the guilty plea, determining that nothing in the rules or West Virginia case law conditions application of the standard on prior formal acceptance. In State v. Huff, 375 S.E.2d 438 (W. Va. 1988), the Supreme Court had applied the fair-and-just-reason analysis where a plea had not yet been accepted.

The Court surveyed persuasive federal authority interpreting earlier versions of the federal rules that closely mirrored West Virginia’s current rules. The Sixth Circuit held that the fair-and-just-reason requirement applies even before a court formally accepts a plea, reasoning that the rule draws no such distinction. United States v. Mader, 251 F.3d 1099 (6th Cir. 2001). The Fifth and Eighth Circuits reached the same conclusion. United States v. Grant, 117 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Payton, 168 F.3d 1103 (8th Cir. 1999). However, the Ninth Circuit took the contrary position that the fair-and-just-reason standard does not attach until after formal acceptance of the plea. United States v. Alvarez-Tautimez, 160 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court noted that while the federal rules have since been amended to address this question explicitly, West Virginia has not amended its counterpart rules, rendering these earlier federal decisions persuasive.

Noting that it had never previously established a specific framework for evaluating whether a defendant has shown a fair and just reason to withdraw a plea, the Court adopted a new multi-factor analysis drawing on approaches from other jurisdictions, including the South Dakota Supreme Court’s analysis in State v. Trueblood, 5 N.W.3d 571 (S.D. 2024), and the Sixth Circuit’s framework discussed in United States v. Haygood, 549 F.3d 1049 (6th Cir. 2008). The Court held that circuit courts should consider the totality of the circumstances and a non-exhaustive list of six factors: (1) whether the defendant pleaded guilty knowingly and voluntarily, (2) whether the defendant asserts innocence, (3) the presence or absence of a valid reason for not seeking withdrawal earlier, (4) whether the defendant received competent counsel in deciding to plead guilty, (5) potential prejudice to the government, including whether it opposes withdrawal, and (6) whether withdrawal would waste judicial resources. The Court stressed that no single factor is controlling and that the significance of each varies with the circumstances surrounding both the original plea and the withdrawal motion.

Conclusion

The Court held that the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard by treating the binding plea agreement as foreclosing withdrawal altogether. Notably, the Court did not hold that Page was entitled to withdraw the plea.

Accordingly, the Court vacated the circuit court’s order accepting Page’s 2003 guilty plea and imposing sentence and remanded for the circuit court to determine whether Page demonstrated a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea. On remand, the Court instructed that the circuit court must consider the newly announced non-exhaustive factors in light of the unusual circumstances of the case, including the 20-year delay, the fact that neither party to the 2003 plea agreement sought to enforce it, the absence of the 2003 plea-hearing transcript and written plea agreement, the current status of the State’s evidence, and Page’s disappearance after the initial plea. See: State v. Page, 2026 W. Va. LEXIS 187 (2026).

Editor’s Note: Anyone interested in the distinction between a court’s acceptance of a guilty plea and its acceptance of a plea agreement is encouraged to read the Court’s full opinion.  

Subscribe today

Already a subscriber? Login