by David M. Reutter

The Supreme Court of Maryland unanimously reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court, holding that a police officer lacked reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances to stop Xavier S. Kopp’s vehicle. The Court concluded that a tip from the officer’s personal acquaintance lacked sufficient indicia of reliability, that the officer’s high-crime area testimony relied on post-stop statistics and failed every factor set forth in Washington v. State, 287 A.3d 301 (Md. 2022), and that the vehicle’s slow, brief forward movement did not constitute flight.

Background

On the evening of January 22, 2023, Montgomery County Police Detective Sergeant Peter J. Muollo received a call directly on his cellphone from a woman he had known personally for 20 to 25 years. The caller, who wished to remain anonymous, reported a “suspicious black sedan” parked on Rosebay Court. She described the vehicle as unfamiliar, said it had been there for “an extended period of time” with cellphones “going on and off” inside, and stated that she “thought” the occupants “were up to illegal activity, possibly breaking into vehicles.”

Muollo arrived within 10 minutes and spotted the sedan. Three marked police vehicles blocked the only exit. When Muollo activated his overhead spotlight and began to exit his vehicle, the sedan moved forward slowly, at approximately 5 to 10 miles per hour. He returned to his cruiser, activated the emergency lights, and approached the vehicle. He immediately detected the odor of marijuana, and another officer observed a large quantity on the back seat. Kopp, the driver, disclosed that he had a firearm.

Kopp was charged with marijuana and firearm offenses and moved to suppress the evidence. At the suppression hearing, Muollo characterized the area as a “high-crime area” and introduced crime analyst statistics documenting over 400 calls for service in the surrounding “Nancy-1 beat” during 2022, though he acknowledged obtaining these figures after the stop. Defense witness Jeffrey Zahler testified that the closest of the 28 calls for service in January 2023 was 0.6 miles from Rosebay Court, and over a 13-month period, only one call, a petty larceny the prior July, had originated from the 12 nearest streets. The circuit court denied suppression. After a conditional guilty plea, Kopp was sentenced to five years of imprisonment with all but six months suspended. The Appellate Court affirmed.

Analysis

The Court began its analysis by recounting that under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), an officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop when the totality of the circumstances known at the time suggests criminal activity may be afoot. Reasonable suspicion may arise from a tip, but the information “must be sufficiently reliable in order to provide reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop.” State v. Rucker, 821 A.2d 439 (Md. 2003). In assessing that reliability, a tipster’s “veracity,” “reliability,” and “basis of knowledge” are highly relevant factors. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). A tip must also exhibit sufficient “indicia of reliability” to justify a stop, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), and must “be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.” Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).

Applying these principles, the Court determined that the tip was “devoid of the indicia of reliability necessary to establish reasonable suspicion.” Although Muollo knew the caller personally, the Court distinguished credibility from reliability, observing that the “most credible of people may convey information that cannot be relied upon to provide reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be occurring.” See Rucker (explaining that a person with a history of providing accurate information about criminal activity increases the indicia of reliability accorded to a tip). Nothing in the record established that the caller had ever provided reliable information about criminal activity to any officer. 

The Court explained that the tip’s fundamental deficiency was its absence of predictive content. In White, the U.S. Supreme Court found sufficient indicia of reliability where the tipster predicted a suspect’s future behavior – her departure time, vehicle description, and destination – because that information “demonstrated inside information – a special familiarity with [the suspect’s] affairs.” In the present case, by contrast, the caller reported only contemporaneous observations such as an unfamiliar vehicle, occupants using cellphones, and a car parked for an extended period, the Court stated. She offered no explanation for why these circumstances signaled illegal activity. The Court stated this amounted to “no more than the caller’s hunch or guess,” noting that an informant’s hunch can no more establish reasonable suspicion than an officer’s can. See Washington (“[A] hunch or general suspicion is not enough.”); Ransome v. State, 816 A.2d 901 (Md. 2003).

The Court then applied J.L., where the U.S. Supreme Court held that officers who verified a person matching an anonymous tip’s description at the reported bus stop still lacked reasonable suspicion, because the tip’s “assertion of illegality” remained uncorroborated. Similarly, in the present case, Muollo confirmed only that a matching vehicle sat at the reported location with occupants inside, verifying the car’s existence while contributing nothing to the allegation of criminal conduct, the Court explained.

High-Crime Area

The Court identified four independent grounds for rejecting the circuit court’s reliance on the area’s crime level. First, Muollo’s detailed testimony relied on statistics obtained from a crime analyst after the stop, violating the requirement that reasonable suspicion be assessed using only information known to the officer at the time. Terry; Trott v. State, 249 A.3d 833 (Md. 2021). Second, because Muollo testified unequivocally that the area was a “high-crime area” and never indicated a lesser characterization would have independently warranted the stop, the Court could not determine whether he would have acted the same under a different assessment of the area.

Third, even crediting the post-stop statistics, the testimony failed every factor the Court articulated in Washington. Reaffirming that holding, the Court reiterated that “testimony concerning a location being a high-crime area must be particularized as to the location or geographic area at issue, the criminal activity known to occur in the area, and the temporal proximity of the criminal activity known to occur in the area to the time of the stop.” Washington. The Nancy-1 beat comprised an area estimated at three to four miles long and up to two miles wide, far broader than the three-street radius deemed “not overly broad” in Washington. Muollo testified about calls for service rather than criminal activity known to have occurred near Rosebay Court, and he drew no temporal connection between specific criminal conduct and the stop. Fourth, allowing courts to bypass Washington by substituting a finding of “significant” crime would render that framework meaningless, the Court warned.

The Court also declared that testimony regarding the volume or type of calls for service, standing alone, “is not sufficient to support a conclusion that an area is a high-crime area,” because such calls indicate only that someone contacted the police, not that a crime occurred.

Vehicle Movement

In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), the U.S. Supreme Court held that unprovoked, headlong flight in a high-crime area was sufficient to furnish reasonable suspicion, characterizing such flight as “the consummate act of evasion.” The Maryland Supreme Court elaborated in Washington that headlong flight involves reckless, frantic evasion, but that conduct bore no resemblance to Kopp’s slow vehicle movement, according to the Court. Because no officer had directed Kopp to stop before his vehicle moved, his actions were “the equivalent of a person, who was free to go, choosing not to engage with a police officer.” The right to decline a consensual encounter and “simply go on [one’s] way,” Wardlow, is well established. See Washington (“[W]hen an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.”).

Conclusion

Thus, the Court held that under the totality of the circumstances, Muollo lacked reasonable suspicion to believe Kopp was engaged in criminal activity. The tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability, the high-crime area testimony was based on post-stop information, failed every Washington requirement, and the vehicle’s movement added nothing to the analysis, the Court reasoned.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland. See: Kopp v. State, 2026 Md. LEXIS (2026).

Editor’s Note: Anyone interested in Fourth Amendment stops, informant tips, and high-crime area testimony is encouraged to read the Court’s full opinion.  

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