by Douglas Ankney

The Supreme Court of South Carolina unanimously reversed the denial of Richard Alexander Murdaugh’s motion for a new trial and remanded for a new trial after his convictions for murdering his wife and son and for two weapons offenses, holding that improper communications by Colleton County Clerk of Court Rebecca Hill to jurors triggered the rebuttable presumption of prejudice under Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), which the State failed to overcome. In doing so, the Court formally adopted the three-step analytical framework from United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 1996), as the governing test in South Carolina for improper extrajudicial contacts with jurors. The Court also held that the post-trial court violated Rule 606(b), SCRE, by asking jurors whether Hill’s comments influenced their verdicts and relying on those answers in its prejudice analysis, and it overruled Ethier v. Fairfield Mem’l Hosp., 842 S.E.2d 355 (S.C. 2020), to the extent Ethier permitted testimony about jurors’ mental processes in reaching a verdict.

Background

On March 2, 2023, a jury convicted Murdaugh of murdering his wife, Margaret Murdaugh, and his son, Paul Murdaugh, along with two counts of weapon possession during a violent crime. While his direct appeal was pending, Murdaugh moved for a new trial, alleging that Clerk of Court Rebecca Hill tampered with the jury by advising jurors not to believe his testimony, pressuring them toward a swift guilty verdict, and supplying misleading information to the trial court to secure the removal of a juror she perceived as defense-friendly.

Multiple jurors described Hill’s conduct at the hearing. Juror Z recounted that Hill told jurors not to be “fooled” by defense evidence and instructed them to “watch him closely” and “look at his actions” before Murdaugh testified. She further testified that Hill urged the jury that deliberations should not take long. Juror X heard Hill characterize the day of Murdaugh’s testimony as “epic” or “important” and comment on the rarity of a defendant testifying. Juror P heard Hill urge jurors to “watch his body language.” The alternate juror testified that Hill warned the assembled jurors not to let the defense “confuse you or convince you or throw you off.” Although Hill denied most of these accounts, Rhonda McElveen, the Barnwell County Clerk of Court who assisted during the trial, testified that Hill had repeatedly expressed her desire to write a book about the case and stated that a guilty verdict would sell more copies. McElveen also reported that Hill made remarks to staff and media that closely matched what the jurors described.

The post-trial court determined that Hill made certain improper comments but concluded they did not affect any juror’s verdict, placing the burden of proving prejudice on Murdaugh. It denied his motion for a new trial.

Analysis

Adoption of Cheek Framework

Reiterating that the Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the South Carolina Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant an impartial jury untainted by external forces, the Court clarified the governing framework for improper third-party contacts with jurors. A defendant challenging the verdict must first present evidence that the extrajudicial contact was more than an innocuous intervention. If that minimal showing is made, the Remmer presumption arises automatically, and the burden shifts to the prevailing party to prove there is no reasonable possibility the improper communication influenced the verdict, the Court instructed. In evaluating whether that burden has been carried, courts examine the entire picture, including the extent of the improper communication, whether the communication was discussed or considered by the jury, the type and timing of the exposure, and the strength of the State’s case. United States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302 (4th Cir. 2009); State v. Kelly, 502 S.E.2d 99 (S.C. 1998). The Court acknowledged South Carolina courts had not always applied Remmer consistently and expressly adopted Cheek as the governing framework.

The Court recognized that a circuit split exists over whether the Remmer presumption survived the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), as documented in United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 2012). The Court observed that neither Phillips nor Olano expressly overruled the presumption, and the Court adopted the Fourth Circuit’s position that the Remmer presumption remains “alive and well.” Lawson.

Turning to the present case, the Court rejected the State’s argument that the post-trial court implicitly discredited the fuller accounts of Hill’s comments. It determined that Murdaugh established Hill told jurors the day of his testimony was “epic” or “important,” urged them not to be “fooled,” “confused,” “thrown off,” or “convinced” by Murdaugh and his defense, and told them to watch his body language closely. The Court concluded those comments were more like the bailiff’s guilt-related statements in Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966), than the procedural deadlock comments in State v. Green, 851 S.E.2d 440 (S.C. 2020), because Hill’s comments went to the merits, attacked Murdaugh’s credibility, and effectively urged a guilty verdict. The Court also stated that Hill’s status as an elected clerk of court who managed the trial and served as the jury’s primary caretaker magnified the prejudicial effect of her remarks.

Rule 606(b) and
Overruling Ethier

The Court held that the post-trial court committed legal error by questioning jurors about whether Hill’s comments influenced their deliberations and by relying on those answers in evaluating prejudice. It explained that Rule 606(b), SCRE, permits jurors to testify about whether extraneous information or outside influence improperly reached the jury, but it categorically prohibits inquiry into any juror’s mental processes in connection with the verdict. The Court overruled Ethier to the extent it permitted such testimony, instructing that the State must rebut the Remmer presumption through evidence that remains within Rule 606(b)’s boundaries.

The Court ruled that the State failed to carry its heavy burden. The Court rejected the post-trial court’s characterization of Hill’s remarks as “limited in subject and not overt as to opinion,” reasoning that Hill clearly urged jurors to discredit Murdaugh and reject his defense. The Court also ruled that the limited number of jurors who acknowledged hearing the comments did not reduce the prejudice because a criminal defendant is entitled to a full panel of impartial jurors. Nor did the strength of the State’s case overcome the presumption. The case was largely circumstantial, Murdaugh’s credibility was central to his defense, and Hill’s comments directly undermined that credibility. Finally, the Court ruled that standard jury instructions could not cure comments that remained concealed until months after trial and that specifically came from the clerk of court, an officer of the court and the jury’s primary caretaker.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court reversed the post-trial court’s denial of Murdaugh’s motion for a new trial and remanded for further proceedings. See: State v. Murdaugh, 2026 S.C. LEXIS 79 (2026) (per curiam).  

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