by David Kim

The Supreme Court of Connecticut unanimously held that a prosecutor’s Brady obligations may extend to impeachment information about a State witness known within the same State’s Attorney’s Office, even when it arose in an unrelated case. The Court rejected the Appellate Court’s conclusion that the prosecutor had no duty to seek out and disclose evidence that a prosecution witness named Alice Phillips had given false testimony in another New London murder case absent a specific defense request. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the dismissal of Miguel Vega’s habeas appeal because the nondisclosure was immaterial given other eyewitness identifications, motive evidence, consciousness-of-guilt evidence, and impeachment at trial.

Background

Vega’s convictions arose from a March 2010 shooting in New London after a bar fight involving Vega and members of another group. Armed intruders later entered an apartment, and witnesses identified Vega as one of them. A jury found him guilty in 2016 of murder, felony murder, home invasion, and other offenses, and he received a total effective sentence of 75 years. The Appellate Court affirmed his conviction.

At Vega’s second criminal trial, the State called several eyewitnesses, including Phillips. She testified that she saw Vega enter the living room with a gun, order everyone to the floor, and shoot toward Michael Ellis before she dove onto a couch with Rahmel Perry, who was killed. The jury also heard Phillips’ 911 call identifying Vega as the shooter. Defense counsel cross-examined Phillips about inconsistencies in her statements, 911 call, probable cause hearing testimony, and prior trial testimony.

The impeachment evidence came from an unrelated New London murder prosecution against Kurtis Turner. Phillips testified for the prosecution in Turner’s trial as a cooperating witness. Before she testified, the prosecutor told her that, if he believed she testified truthfully, he would notify the prosecutor handling her pending Connecticut charges of her cooperation. But when Phillips was asked whether she hoped for any consideration other than travel expenses, she answered “no,” and the prosecutor did not correct the answer.

Eight months before Phillips testified at Vega’s second trial, Turner filed an amended habeas petition alleging that the State violated Brady by knowingly presenting and failing to correct Phillips’ false testimony. The Appellate Court later held that the failure to correct Phillips’ false testimony violated Turner’s due process right to a fair trial.

Vega then filed his own habeas petition, claiming that the State violated Brady by failing to disclose Phillips’ false testimony in Turner’s case. The habeas court denied relief, and the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, refusing to impute that knowledge to Vega’s prosecutor.

Analysis

The Court began its analysis by reviewing Brady’s three-part framework in which the defendant must show: (1) the evidence is “favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching,” (2) the evidence was suppressed by the State either willfully or inadvertently, and (3) the evidence was material to the case. State v. Ortiz, 911 A.2d 1055 (Conn. 2006); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999). Due process requires the prosecution to disclose evidence favorable to the accused when it is material to guilt or punishment, regardless of prosecutorial good faith or bad faith. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Demers v. State, 547 A.2d 28 (Conn. 1988). Because impeachment evidence includes evidence that could alter the jury’s assessment of a significant prosecution witness, the Court determined that Phillips’ prior false testimony fell within the type of information that can trigger Brady review. Adams v. Commissioner of Correction, 71 A.3d 512 (Conn. 2013).

The Court then addressed the prosecutor’s duty to seek out Brady material. That duty is not confined to evidence in the trial prosecutor’s actual possession; it indisputably “reaches beyond evidence in the prosecutor’s actual possession.” United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). The duty extends to material and exculpatory evidence within the prosecution’s possession or available to it, including evidence the prosecution knew or should have known was exculpatory. Demers. The Court explained that Connecticut precedent likewise recognizes that the duty can encompass favorable evidence not personally known to the attorney trying the case when the evidence is known to others acting on the State’s behalf in the case. State v. Guerrera, 206 A.3d 160 (Conn. 2019); Kyles.

The Court stated that the Appellate Court had read Guerrera too broadly. Guerrera involved 1,552 Department of Correction recordings created for administrative and security purposes, not reviewed by the State, and not reasonably treated as part of the prosecution’s investigatory file. Guerrera held that Brady did not require such a broad search of another agency’s unreviewed records absent a specific and limited request. But Guerrera did not decide whether a prosecutor must search files within his own office for impeachment material about the State’s own trial witness, according to the Court.

The Court found Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), particularly important because it treats a prosecutor’s office as a single entity for Brady purposes. In Giglio, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that the prosecution cannot avoid disclosure by compartmentalizing information within the office and that the prosecutor’s office is responsible as a corporate entity for disclosure. Giglio; Adams. The Court also relied on authority recognizing constructive possession when a prosecutor lacks actual knowledge but should have known the material existed. United States v. Joseph, 996 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Auten, 632 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1980).

The Court ruled that the New London State’s Attorney’s Office is a single entity that speaks for the State on criminal matters in that district. Consequently, the prosecution was not relieved of its Brady obligations simply because the prosecutor trying Vega’s case was not personally aware of exculpatory evidence in the same State’s Attorney’s Office related to that case. The Court stated that the duty extended to information concerning the State’s own witness known to another prosecutor within the New London office, even though it arose in an unrelated matter. Giglio; Adams.

The Court discussed the limits of its ruling. It did not require open-ended fishing expeditions through every unrelated file to eliminate any remote possibility of exculpatory information. Nor did it decide whether Brady material known to one State’s Attorney’s Office must be imputed to a different State’s Attorney’s Office in another judicial district. The case required only a thorough inquiry into the same office’s files regarding a trial witness when the same civilian witness testified in two murder cases in the same judicial district and her testimony in one case was the subject of an ongoing habeas proceeding being handled by that same office, the Court explained. Under those facts, the Court stated that the prosecutor was required to have disclosed the accusation that Phillips had testified falsely or, at a minimum, to have requested that the trial court undertake an in camera review of the available information to determine whether disclosure to the defense was required.

The Court then turned to materiality, which prevented Vega from obtaining relief. Evidence is material only when there is a reasonable probability of a different result had the evidence been disclosed; a mere possibility that the evidence might have helped the defense does not suffice. State v. Jordan, 102 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2014); State v. Ortiz, 747 A.2d 487 (Conn. 2000). When a conviction depends entirely on a witness, impeachment evidence affecting that witness’ credibility may be constitutionally material, but nondisclosure ordinarily will not undermine confidence in the verdict when the State’s case is otherwise strong and the witness’ testimony is not dispositive. Demers; Ortiz; Strickler.

Applying that standard, the Court concluded that disclosure of Phillips’ prior false testimony did not create a reasonable probability of a different result. Phillips was important, but four other eyewitnesses who knew Vega identified him as the intruder and shooter. The State also presented evidence of the bar fight that supplied motive and Vega’s flight to Georgia as consciousness-of-guilt evidence. Defense counsel substantially impeached Phillips through inconsistencies in her statements, 911 call, and prior testimony, as well as her intoxication on the night of the shooting. Because the jury already had ample grounds to assess her credibility, the nondisclosure did not undermine confidence in the verdict, the Court concluded.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court vacated the Appellate Court’s judgment only to the extent it held that the prosecutor had no responsibility to seek out and disclose information that a State witness had previously given false testimony at another trial. It otherwise affirmed the Appellate Court’s dismissal of Vega’s habeas appeal because the undisclosed impeachment evidence was immaterial under Brady. See: Vega v. Commissioner of Correction, 354 Conn. 437 (2026).  

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