by David Kim

The Supreme Court of Colorado, sitting en banc, unanimously held that the prosecution’s second pretrial appeal, challenging a county court evidentiary ruling under CRE 401, 402, and 403, did not qualify as an “interlocutory appeal” under Colorado’s speedy trial statute because the prosecution’s assertion that the appeal was authorized by Crim. P. 37.1(a) lacked arguable merit. The Court reasoned that in criminal motions practice, “suppress” is a term of art referring to the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, usually because of a constitutional violation, and not to ordinary evidentiary rulings excluding evidence as cumulative, irrelevant, or unfairly prejudicial. Applying People v. Gallegos, 946 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1997), which requires an interlocutory appeal to be taken in good faith to toll the speedy trial deadline, the Court concluded that the unauthorized appeal did not toll the deadline and therefore violated the defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial, requiring reversal and dismissal with prejudice.

Background

Khristina Phillips operated a home daycare. After a parent reported that Phillips’ teenage son had engaged in inappropriate conduct with children at the daycare, Detective Donya Davis investigated the allegations and asked Phillips to come to the police station for an interview. Phillips agreed, and the interview was recorded on video. During the interview, she described her son’s sexualized behavior in detail.

The prosecution charged Phillips with child abuse and operating a childcare facility without a license. After she entered a not guilty plea, the county court established a speedy trial deadline. Before trial, Phillips filed a motion to suppress the video, arguing that Davis had violated her Miranda rights by failing to advise her when her custodial status changed. The county court agreed that a Miranda violation had occurred and suppressed a portion of the video.

The prosecution filed an interlocutory appeal in the district court pursuant to Crim. P. 37.1(a), challenging the suppression order. The district court reversed, determining that Phillips was never in custody during the interview and therefore no Miranda violation had occurred. On remand, the parties agreed that this first interlocutory appeal had properly tolled the speedy trial deadline, and a new deadline was established.

Seven days before the rescheduled trial, both parties announced ready at a pretrial conference. On the Monday evening before the Wednesday trial, the prosecutor emailed defense counsel declaring his intention to introduce the entire interview video. On the morning of trial, the prosecutor raised the issue with the court. Defense counsel objected. The county court judge expressed frustration that the prosecutor had raised the matter at the last moment while prospective jurors waited in the assembly room. The judge then ruled that the video would be excluded because it was duplicative of anticipated testimony, portions were irrelevant under CRE 401, and parts that were relevant were nevertheless unfairly prejudicial under CRE 403.

When the prosecutor asked whether the court had “suppressed” the video, the judge responded unequivocally that he was “not suppress[ing]” it. Rather, the judge explained that his ruling was “strictly evidentiary” and could not serve as grounds for an interlocutory appeal. The judge stated no fewer than five times that he was not suppressing the video but was instead “exercising [his] authority … under CRE 401, 402, and 403.”

Disregarding this admonition, the prosecution filed a second interlocutory appeal during jury selection. The county court declared a mistrial after determining that jurisdiction had transferred to the district court. The district court subsequently dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that Crim. P. 37.1 requires suppression of evidence for the court to have appellate jurisdiction. The district court observed that “[t]here is nothing unusual about requiring inadmissible evidence to be edited out of a defendant’s videotaped interview before it is presented to a jury.”

On remand, Phillips moved to dismiss, arguing her speedy trial rights had been violated because the second appeal was unauthorized and thus did not toll the deadline. The county court denied the motion, finding the appeal had been taken “in good faith.” After trial, the jury convicted Phillips on both charges. The district court affirmed, ruling that the prosecution had made “a colorable argument” warranting an interlocutory appeal. Phillips sought review in the Colorado Supreme Court.

Analysis

The Court reviewed de novo all questions presented, explaining that interpretation of the speedy trial statute, construction of the rules of criminal procedure, and application of precedent all present questions of law subject to independent appellate review. People v. Lucy, 467 P.3d 332 (Colo. 2020); People v. Zhuk, 239 P.3d 437 (Colo. 2010).

The Court observed that Colorado’s speedy trial statute guarantees that defendants must be brought to trial within six months of entering a not guilty plea. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(1) (2025). Failure to comply requires dismissal with prejudice. Id. The Court stated that this statutory protection serves as “a vital bulwark in defense of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Under § 18-1-405(6)(b), the speedy trial deadline is tolled during the pendency of an interlocutory appeal. Consequently, the Court noted that the critical question was whether the prosecution’s second appeal qualified as “interlocutory” under the statute.

The Gallegos Good-Faith
Standard

The Court explained that although the speedy trial statute does not define “interlocutory appeal,” the Colorado Supreme Court had previously addressed the issue in Gallegos. Under that decision, an interlocutory appeal qualifies for tolling purposes when it “is taken in good faith before a defendant has been convicted and sentence is imposed, and … necessarily disrupts the course of proceeding to a final resolution.” The Court added that “[a]n appeal is taken in good faith when the assertion that such an appeal is authorized has arguable merit, is not taken for the purpose of delay, and the issues raised have a substantial effect on the prosecution’s case.” Id.

Crim. P. 37.1(a) authorizes interlocutory appeals from county court rulings “granting a motion to suppress evidence” or “granting a motion to suppress an extra-judicial confession or admission.” The prosecution argued this language encompassed the county court’s evidentiary ruling. The Court disagreed.

It explained that in criminal motions practice, “suppress” operates as “a term of art” denoting “the exclusion from trial of any evidence procured illegally, typically in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights or protections.” This specialized meaning appears in Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines a motion to suppress as “a pretrial motion to exclude evidence from a criminal trial; esp., a request that the court prohibit the introduction of illegally obtained evidence.” The Court further explained that “suppression of evidence is … generally confined to violations of constitutional rights” rather than statutory violations. People v. Shinaut, 940 P.2d 380 (Colo. 1997); People v. Bowers, 716 P.2d 471 (Colo. 1986).

Applying this definition, the Court concluded that the county court judge’s ruling bore no hallmarks of suppression. The judge explicitly and repeatedly stated he was not suppressing the video but rather exercising evidentiary discretion under CRE 401, 402, and 403. The judge even contrasted this evidentiary ruling with his earlier ruling on the “suppression issue,” the Miranda challenge, which had properly been the subject of the first interlocutory appeal.

The Court rejected the prosecution’s attempt to equate “suppress” with “exclude,” reasoning that accepting such an interpretation “would be to greenlight interlocutory appeals following any adverse pretrial evidentiary ruling.” The Court stated that this would produce “an absurd result” by handing prosecutors “a blank check to toll the speedy trial deadline based on any unfavorable evidentiary ruling.” Principles of statutory construction require courts to avoid interpretations leading to absurd results. McCoy v. People, 442 P.3d 379 (Colo. 2019).

Conclusion

Because the prosecution’s assertion that its second pretrial appeal was legally authorized lacked arguable merit, the Court concluded that the appeal was not taken in good faith under Gallegos and therefore did not qualify as “interlocutory” for purposes of § 18-1-405(6)(b). Thus, the unauthorized appeal did not toll the speedy trial deadline, and Phillips’ statutory right to a speedy trial was violated, the Court ruled.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to return the case to the county court, so it may vacate Phillips’ conviction and dismiss the case with prejudice. See: Phillips v. People, 2026 CO 21 (2026) (en banc).  

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