Skip navigation
CLN bookstore
× You have 2 more free articles available this month. Subscribe today.

Maryland’s Top Court Rules Actual Notice by Trial Judge Unnecessary to Trigger Hearing Requirement On Defendant’s Request to Replace Defense Counsel

by Christopher Zoukis

Maryland’s top court, the Court of Appeals, reversed the conviction of a defendant because the trial court failed to entertain and rule on the defendant’s multiple written requests to fire his attorney.

The February 21, 2018 opinion upheld an intermediate court of appeal order that reversed his convictions and remanded for further proceedings.

Robert Weddington was arrested on multiple charges relating to the sexual abuse of two minors.

On October 28, 2015, Weddington mailed a letter to the judge seeking permission to terminate his public defender. On November 9, 2015, pursuant to Md. Rule 4-215(e), a hearing was held, and Weddington’s request was denied. Trial was set for February 2, 2016.

Thereafter, Weddington sent two additional letters making similar requests, one received by the circuit court clerk’s office on November 24, 2015, and the other received on January 20, 2016.

Although the letters were received by the clerk’s office, the trial judge did not did not actually become aware of the letters until after Weddington’s trial. Both letters unequivocally requested that his attorney be relieved of her duties. Weddington was convinced that his public defender believed that he was guilty and was not using her best efforts to defend him.

The trial court did not hold a hearing on either of these letters. Trial was held, and Weddington was convicted. He filed a motion for a new trial based, in part, on the fact that his requests for a different defense attorney were never heard. The trial court held a post-trial hearing on this motion and denied relief. The trial court believed that Weddington should have mentioned the letters at trial and, in any case, said it wouldn’t have allowed him to fire his attorney even if a proper hearing had been held.

Weddington appealed and the Court of Special Appeals reversed. The State then petitioned the Maryland Court of Appeals for certiorari, which the Court granted. Maryland’s top court upheld the intermediate court’s ruling.

There were two questions before the Court: (1) did Weddington’s letters trigger the requirements of Rule 4-215(e) when the clerk’s office received them even though the trial judge did not have actual notice of them and (2) did Weddington waive his request to replace his defense attorney by failing to repeat his request to the judge prior to or during trial?

In addressing the first question, the Court ruled that actual notice by the trial judge is not required to trigger the requirements of Rule 4-215(e). Because the Rule protects a fundamental right, i.e., the right to effective assistance of counsel, the Court reasoned that strict compliance with the statute is necessary and declined to introduce a requirement for actual notice by the trial judge in order to trigger the requirements of the Rule. The Court said that whether the trial judge had actual knowledge of the letters was immaterial. According to the Court, what mattered was that the letters were clear, and the clerk’s office had received them. Upon receipt of Weddington’s letters, a pretrial hearing should have been held regardless of whether the trial judge had actual notice of his requests.

The Court further determined that Weddington did not waive his right to the hearing by failing to mention the letters or otherwise request his counsel be replaced during trial. The letters spoke for themselves and had been received by the clerk’s office, and nothing in Rule 4-215(e) requires a defendant to bring the request to a court’s attention once duly filed in writing.

Finally, the Court held that the post-trial hearing on Weddington’s requests for new counsel did not render the error harmless. In a previous case, Lopez v. State, 420 Md. 18 (2011), the Court of Appeals said the provisions of Rule 4-215 “are mandatory, must be strictly complied with, and are not subject to harmless error analysis.” The reason for this is obvious: by the time trial is over, the ship has already sailed. “A post-trial ruling on defendant’s reasons for his request cannot cure a violation of the Rule,” wrote the Court.

In sum, the Court ruled that Weddington effectively invoked the requirements of Rule 4-215(e), the trial court had constructive knowledge of his letters before trial, he did not waive his request by failing to reiterate his request to replace his attorney at trial, and a post-trial hearing could not cure the trial court’s error in not holding a prompt hearing. The error required reversal of Weddington’s convictions.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. See: State v. Weddington, 179 A.3d 1028 (Md. 2018). 

 

As a digital subscriber to Criminal Legal News, you can access full text and downloads for this and other premium content.

Subscribe today

Already a subscriber? Login

Related legal case

State v. Weddington




 

Advertise here

 

InmateMagazineService.com

 

Advertise here