The Supreme Court of the United States held that courts may not apply the “moment-of-threat” doctrine when evaluating the reasonableness of police officers’ use of deadly force involving claims of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the doctrine improperly narrows the requisite inquiry into the “totality of the circumstances.”

Background

On April 28, 2016, police officer Robert Felix Jr. received an alert that a vehicle with outstanding toll violations was on the highway outside of Houston, Texas. He spotted the Toyota Corolla in question and activated his emergency lights, initiating a traffic stop. Ashtian Barnes, the driver of the Corolla, pulled over to the shoulder of the highway, and Felix parked his police cruiser behind it. 

Felix approached the driver-side door of the Corolla and asked Barnes for his driver’s license and proof of insurance. Barnes advised that he did not have his license with him and that the car was a rental in his girlfriend’s name. As he was speaking, Barnes continued rummaging through some papers inside the vehicle, prompting Felix to order him several times to stop “digging around.” 

Felix indicated that he smelled the odor of marijuana and asked Barnes if there was anything in the car he should know about. Barnes said that his identification may be in the trunk, so Felix ordered him to open the trunk from the driver’s seat. Barnes complied while also turning off the ignition. The dashcam recording from the police cruiser showed that the events up to this point occurred in less than two minutes. 

With his right hand positioned on his holster, Felix ordered Barnes to exit the vehicle. Barnes opened the door but did not get out. Instead, he turned the ignition on and began to move forward. Felix drew his firearm, jumped on the car’s doorsill, and shouted, “Don’t fucking move.” Unable to see inside the moving Corolla because his head was above the roof, Felix fired two rounds into the car. Although he was hit, Barnes was able to stop the vehicle. By the time help arrived, Barnes was dead. 

From the moment the Corolla began to move and when it stopped, approximately five seconds elapsed. Within that timeframe, two seconds passed from the moment Felix stepped onto the doorsill and when he fired the first shot. 

Procedural History

Barnes’ mother, Janice, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Felix violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him. 

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment to Felix. It explained that to prevail, Janice must show that Felix’s use of force was “objectively unreasonable.” Ordinarily, the determination of reasonableness would involve an examination of a wide variety of circumstances. But when deadly force is involved, “the Fifth Circuit has developed a much narrower approach” referred to as the moment-of-threat doctrine, the District Court noted. Under the doctrine, only the circumstances existing at the exact moment that triggered the use of deadly force are considered, it elaborated. In the present case, the relevant moment was “the two seconds before Felix fired his first shot” as he was standing on the doorsill of the moving vehicle. The District Court determined that Felix could reasonably believe that he was “at risk of serious harm” at that moment and that his use of deadly force was reasonable. Under the moment-of-threat doctrine, that fact alone stops the analysis, and no further inquiry is permitted. 

The District Court opined that a “more robust examination” into “what had transpired” before Felix jumped onto the doorsill and fired the two shots might have helped in assessing the reasonableness of Felix’s decision to shoot into the Corolla, but it acknowledged that it was “duty bound” by precedent to limit its inquiry as it had done. 

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, stating that it too was bound by circuit precedent. 

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether courts may apply the moment-of-threat doctrine when analyzing Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. 

Analysis

The Court began its analysis by reviewing the law governing claims of excessive force during a stop or arrest, noting that such claims are “analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). The “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’” which is measured in objective terms. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). Therefore, the question is whether the force used was justified from “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.” Graham; County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420 (2017). 

The Court stated that the determination of the reasonableness of police use of force requires examining the “totality of the circumstances.” Mendez. It noted that there is no “easy-to-apply legal test” for the reasonableness determination. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). Instead, whether the use of force was objectively reasonable requires “careful attention to the facts and circumstances” regarding the incident known to the officer at the time force was used, the Court explained. Graham. Factors to consider include (1) the “severity of the crime” that triggered the stop, see Graham, (2) actions taken by the officer prior to the stop such as providing warnings and other attempted means of controlling the encounter, see Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), and (3) the stopped suspect’s conduct because it indicates the level of threat posed, see Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015). 

Importantly, the totality of the circumstances determination regarding the use of force “has no time limit,” according to the Court. It explained that the exact moment force was used “will often be what matters most,” but “earlier facts and circumstances may bear on how a reasonable officer would have understood and responded to later ones.” 

The Court then turned to the issue of the moment-of-threat doctrine, stating that it prevents the type of examination of context required by the totality of the circumstances inquiry. As such, the doctrine “conflicts with this Court’s instruction to analyze the totality of the circumstances,” i.e., it improperly narrows the required Fourth Amendment analysis. 

For example, applying the moment-of-threat doctrine, the lower courts in the present case focused solely on the two seconds from the time Felix jumped on the doorsill to the first shot fired. However, they were required to take into consideration all the facts leading up to that moment as part of their reasonableness analysis, including what Felix knew at the time, but the lower courts failed to do so because they applied the moment-of-threat doctrine, the Court explained. Thus, the Court held that courts may not apply the moment-of-threat doctrine “because that rule constricts the proper inquiry into the ‘totality of the circumstances.” 

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See: Barnes v. Felix, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 1834 (2025).   

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